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NOTE
FAIR ENOUGH?
RECONCILING THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS AND
JUSTICE WITH PRESERVING THE NATURE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a study co-authored by Richard W. Naimark, the Senior Vice
President of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), and
Stephanie E. Keer, certain surprises were uncovered regarding the
perception of private international commercial arbitration by attorneys
and business people.' The most noteworthy was the "overwhelming
relative importance of the fairness and justice of the process" compared
to other traditional key characteristics of international commercial
arbitration.2 In fact, the vast majority of survey participants ranked a fair
and just result as the single most important attribute of the process,
nearly twice as important as the closest-ranked attribute.3 The authors of
1. Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, InternationalPrivate Commercial Arbitration:
Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People, 30 INT'L Bus. LAW 203 (2002).
The authors surveyed between 121 to 131 participants, including claimants, respondents, attorneys,
and business persons, both prior to the first hearing and after the award. Id. app. at 209. Participants
were then asked to rank the importance of eight factors (speed of outcome, privacy, receipt of
monetary award, a fair and just outcome, cost-efficiency, finality of a decision, arbitrator expertise,
and continuing relationship) from one to eight, with one being the most important. Id.
2. Id. at 203. For an overview of fairness and justice in the law, see Stewart F. Hancock, Jr.,
Meeting the Needs: Fairness, Morality, Creativity and Common Sense, 68 ALB. L. REv. 81, 86-90
(2004) (proposing that the notion of fairness is imbedded in Western legal systems and contains two
innate attributes-a moral or ethical component and the so-called "human dimension") and Jack M.
Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1303 (1998) (arguing that relaxatioh of rigid
processes of litigation does not necessarily imply relaxation of principles of procedural fairness).
3. Naimark & Keer, supra note I, at 204. Eighty-one percent of those surveyed ranked a fair
and just result as most important, while only forty-one to forty-six percent ranked other attributes
(receipt of monetary award, speed of outcome, cost, and arbitrator expertise) as most important. Id.
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the study proposed that a philosophical, even idealistic, concept of
justice that implies both substantive and procedural justice is of
significant importance to participants in international arbitration.4 A
natural inquiry arises as to what elements of the process communicate
fairness to participants. This Note explores the different characteristics
of international commercial arbitration that arguably create the
perception of justice "in a grand sense," 5 proposing that such
characteristics are present in every aspect of the process. This Note does
not dispute that participants increasingly care about fairness and justice
in the process 6 and that "good client service [by arbitration counsel]
includes methods for communicating the essential qualities of the
process as well as the results."7 In fact, it is clear that the landscape of
international commercial arbitration is changing and the traditional key
characteristics of the process, such as speed, cost, informality, and
confidentiality, are becoming both less practical and less lucrative. 8 It is

possible that the pursuit of fairness and justice, with its increasing
desirability, will guarantee continued viability of the process without
interfering with the practical feasibility of arbitration. 9 To that end, this
Note discusses at length the variety of attributes that communicate the
elements of fairness and justice to the arbitrating public. However, this
Note further argues that the quest for fairness and justice should not
come at the expense of compromising the advantages and integral
4. Naimark and Keer explain that substantive justice implies receiving the "right" result,
whereas procedural justice means getting the result in the "right way." Id. at 205.
5.

Id. at 208.

6. Based on the survey findings, Naimark and Keer argue that "justice, in the larger sense of
the word, matters to parties." Id. at 204.
7. Id. at 205.
8.

See Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on InternationalArbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J.

ON DiSP. RESOL. 69, 70 (2003) (addressing the United States' influence on international commercial
arbitration); Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality
Obligation in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 969, 1024-25 (2001)
(discussing the changing perception of confidentiality in arbitration); Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions
Between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.

121, 136-37 (2003) (challenging the traditional idea that international arbitration must be
confidential); Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of lnarbitrabilityand Public Policy Checks
on U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1662-63

(1991) (discussing the increasing autonomy and liberalization of arbitration); Gu Weixia, Note,
Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in International Commercial Arbitration?, 15 AM.
REV. INT'L AR-B. 607, 610-11 (2004) (explaining the split between "the old world" and "the new

world" perception of confidentiality in arbitration) [hereinafter Gu].
9.

In fact, Sever believes that the pursuit of fairness is essential to the continued viability of

arbitration and argues that "[tlhe walls of court authority [have] all but collapsed in many
countries.... [Thus, there is a] possibility that arbitration will be allowed to violate basic principles

of fairness." Sever, supra note 8, at 1663.
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characteristics of international arbitration. The search for substantive and
procedural justice capable of satisfying the global perception of fairness
will interfere with the very essential fabric of a private commercial
process and alter the very practice and nature of international
°
commercial arbitration.'
In Part II, this Note will discuss the changing nature of international
commercial arbitration and the decreasing importance of traditional key
characteristics. Specifically, it will discuss the element of
confidentiality-traditionally perceived as the primary selling point of
international arbitration'"-and its demise in light of its impracticality
and arguable impossibility. 12 Instead, it is entirely possible that the
fairness and justice of the process is precisely what the parties are
seeking in modem international commercial arbitration. 3 The question
arises-what is fairness in arbitration? Part III will begin to discuss the
manifestation of a demand for fairness in international arbitration and
the resulting presence of characteristics aimed at the pursuit of such
fairness and justice. This Part will posit that, as a private commercial
process, international arbitration has developed sufficient rules and
limitations on its participants to ensure the quality of fairness and justice
suitable for the commercial public-the primary users of international
commercial arbitration.' 4 This Part will also introduce the inherent
conflict between the pursuit of fairness and justice and the maintenance
of core characteristics that make arbitration a private commercial
process. Part IV will continue the discussion of the proposition that
international commercial arbitration procedures are capable of
10. For a discussion of a similar issue within the context of the tension between lex
mercatoria and amiable composition, see Karyn S. Weinberg, Note, Equity in International
Arbitration: How Fair is "Fair"? A Study ofLex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, 12 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 227, 252-54 (1994). Weinberg argues that a pursuit ofjustice in arbitration poses a danger
of a situation where arbitrators would impose their personal sense of equity and arbitrary decisions
would result. Id. at 252-53. Additionally, it has been suggested that increasing arbitration of
statutory claims would imply the necessity of an arbitration "record" fundamentally altering the
nature and practice of arbitration. Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, InternationalADR
in the 1990's: The Top Ten Developments, I HOUS. BUS. &TAX. L.J. 184,197(2001).
11. ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 27 (4th ed. 2004).

12. Brown, supra note 8, at 1017-19.
13. See Naimark & Keer, supra note 1, at 204.
14. "Commercial parties [can] agree to virtually any procedural arrangement they want[],
subject only to extreme abuses that [are] protected against at the award enforcement stage."
Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the "Have-Nots " in InternationalArbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341,
343 (2007). Rogers concentrates on non-commercial parties and how they may be affected by
international arbitration. See id. at 341-42. However, the focus of this Note is on the dealings
between commercial and (reasonably) sophisticated parties.
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autonomously ensuring sufficient safeguards on fairness and justice.
This Part will divide the processes of international commercial
arbitration into three facets: (1) procedure and substance, (2) ethics, and
(3) social policy; and will discuss the procedures already in existence
which ensure the fairness of arbitral proceedings. This Part will also
argue that in each of these facets there are fundamental elements that,
when combined, create the guarantee of optimal fairness and justice for
the arbitrating public.1 5 This discussion then concludes with the finding
that appellate review and arbitral finality are incompatible with one
another, and attempts to combine these two concepts will result in
compromising the nature of international commercial arbitration.
1I.

THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION

Over the past several decades, arbitration has become the preferred
means for resolving international business disputes.' 6 Historically,
several elements in various combinations have been cited as the primary
characteristics that cause commercial parties to prefer arbitration over
litigation. These characteristics include procedural flexibility, autonomy
from national courts, greater speed of conflict resolution, lower costs,
parties' choice of arbitrators and arbitral forum, neutrality, informality,
and confidentiality. 17 However, each characteristic naturally has
drawbacks that compromise its propounded benefit. A brief survey that
will be discussed in this Part serves as an illustration that the
traditionally recognized advantages of international commercial
15. Naimark and Keer conclude their study with a suggestion that further study is warranted
as to what aspects of arbitration communicate fairness to parties and whether there are procedures
and behaviors that affect these perceptions. Naimark & Keer, supra note 1, at 206.
16. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (1993)
(stating that an arbitration clause is found in approximately ninety percent of international economic
contracts); Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the
Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 105 (1997).
17. CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: DESIGNING PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 136-39 (1996);

Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Post-Award Experience in InternationalCommercial
Arbitration, DIsP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2005, at 94, 95 [hereinafter Naimark & Keer, Post-Award].
For a discussion regarding confidentiality, see Expert Report of Stephen Bond Esq. (in Esso/BHP v.
Plowman), II ARB. INT'L 273, 273-74 (1995) (the former Secretary-General of the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") states that individuals, governments, and businesses using the
services of the ICC invariably place a high value upon confidentiality as a fundamental
characteristic of international commercial arbitration). Naimark and Keer, however, posit that
privacy is the second-to-last most desirable factor in arbitration. Naimark & Keer, supra note 1, at
207; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 1017 ("[T]here are several arguments against a duty of
confidentiality in international arbitration.").
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arbitration cannot unequivocally guarantee attraction of commercial
parties to arbitration.' 8 Instead, it is evident that the arbitrating public is
increasingly pursuing fairness and justice in arbitration in addition to the
desire to maintain the traditional characteristics that have shaped
arbitration over the last several decades.' 9 Clearly, an inevitable tension
must result between the pursuit of fairness and justice (as such pursuit is
too reminiscent of a judicial system of dispute resolution) and the private
nature of arbitration.2 0 A subsequent balance must develop between the
guarantees that attract commercial parties to arbitration and the
guarantee of fairness and justice.2' Only this delicate balance, stricken in
light of the traditional elements that make arbitration a truly private and
truly alternative process, will allow arbitration to maintain its distinct
character and attraction to the commercial public.
In Naimark and Keer's survey, many of the traditional
characteristics of arbitration ranked lower than did achieving a fair and
just result. 22 Among these were cost, speed, arbitrator expertise, and

privacy. 23 While arbitration has the potential to provide for greater speed
than litigation, this potential is hardly always a certainty due to party
autonomy, a myriad of dilatory tactics, and potential problems in
obtaining evidence, which may be prohibitive to a speedy resolution.24
Moreover, the ability to obtain a summary judgment in a courtroom
setting often makes litigation a significantly faster dispute resolution
method. 5 Costs, which may be lower in arbitration, may also as easily
become excessive due to arbitrators' fees,
administrative costs, and the
26
cost of travel to the place of arbitration.

18. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
19. Naimark & Keer, supranote 1, at 203.
20. See Jessica L. Gelander, Comment, Judicial Review of InternationalArbitral Awards:
Preserving Independence in InternationalCommercialArbitrations, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 626-27

(1997); Weinberg, supra note 10, at 247.
21.

"Many

practitioners

believe arbitration

is the sole acceptable

dispute resolution

process .... The apparent neutrality of the forum, divorced from the sovereign influences of a
nation's judiciary, offers perhaps the primary motivation for recourse to arbitration." Weinberg,
supra note 10, at 227. Precisely this divorce from the constraints of a national judiciary creates the
danger of neglecting considerations of fairness. Id. at 252-53; see also Sever, supra note 8, at 1663

(arguing that privatizing arbitration will lead to violations of fairness).
22. Naimark & Keer, supranote 1, at 203.
23.

Cost ranked second out of eight, and speed, arbitrator expertise, and privacy ranked fifth,

sixth, and seventh, respectively. Id. at 206.
24. See RICHARD GARNETr ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 12 (2000).

25. Id.
26. Id.at 13.
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The pivotal role of arbitrators to the process and outcome of
arbitration is undisputed, and Naimark and Keer's survey supports that
finding. 27 However, changes in the norms of arbitration have raised
questions about the role of the arbitrator, such as the extent to which an
arbitrator's personal sense of justice may influence the outcome,28 as
well as the issue of constraints placed upon arbitrators' neutrality by
arbitral institutions, rules, and conventions.29
As a representative example of the changing nature of arbitration, a
detailed discussion of the confidentiality issue follows. Confidentiality
and privacy have long been held to be the main attractions and the
primary distinguishing characteristics of international arbitration.3 °
While confidentiality is certainly important in instances where highly
sensitive financial and technological information is involved, it is
important to realize that confidentiality often gives way to
considerations of national policies advocating openness and
transparency.3 1 In fact, courts increasingly recognize that no blanket
requirement of confidentiality can or should exist in international
commercial arbitration, 32 and that such requirement is not implied or
clearly mandated by any law or principle.33 Contrary to what an
inexperienced party may be led to believe, information that is already in

27. Naimark & Keer, supra note 1, at 206.
28. Weinberg, supra note 10, at 252-54.
29. See infra Part 111.
30. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 27. Scholars distinguish between the concept of
"confidentiality" and "privacy." See Gu, supra note 8, at 609. "Simply speaking, privacy refers to
excluding strangers from taking part in the arbitration hearing, while confidentiality refers to the
non-disclosure relationship among the arbitration participants." Id. (internal citation omitted). For
the purposes of this Note, the term "confidentiality" will refer to a non-disclosure relationship and,
unless otherwise noted, proceedings that take place in the absence of third parties. As Gu notes,
"even to the extent that an arbitration is private and the public are not admitted, it does not
necessarily follow that documents produced for and as a result of that hearing are confidential, nor
are those present at the hearing necessarily bound by terms of confidentiality." Id.
31. See, e.g., Esso Austl. Res. Ltd. v. Plowman (1995) 183 C.L.R. 10, 29 (a decision from the
High Court of Australia created a public interest exception to the duty of confidentiality in
arbitration); see also Sever, supra note 8, at 1663 ("Arbitrability and public policy overlap in
arbitration practice; indeed, a violation of public policy, in some countries, may render an
agreement inarbitrable.").
32. See Monique Pongracic-Speier, Confidentiality and the Public Interest Exception:
Considerationsfor Mixed International Arbitration, 3 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 231, 232 (2002)
(while a number of courts still affirm "confidentiality as a legal feature of commercial
arbitration .... [T]hese confirmations of confidentiality are counterbalanced by a building body of
opinion in favour of restricting, or even denying, confidentiality in arbitration.").
33. A.!L Trade award Upheld, Swedish Supreme Court Affirms Court of Appeal, 15-11
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (Nov. 2000) (Court rejected the principle that a duty of confidentiality
is implied-in-law).
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the public domain cannot be rendered confidential by arbitration.34
Moreover, awards are often made known to authorities such as auditors,
creditors, shareholders, and insurance companies.3 5
From a functional standpoint, blanket confidentiality prevents the
standardization of the arbitration processes, dissemination of details of
rulings and proceedings, and establishment of a body of principles,
leading to repetitive dispute resolution and inability to apply prior
experience to resolution of difficult disputes.36 Subsequently, this
confidentiality can jeopardize such useful elements as low cost and
speedy resolution, not to mention the need for a body of precedent and
principles in light of the fast growth of the use of arbitration.3 7
Moreover, the need for transparency and setting of precedent along with
the overriding policy considerations allegedly make complete
confidentiality an illusion. 38 Critics of confidentiality in arbitration argue
that given potentially undesirable implications both for individual parties
and for the arbitration process as a whole, a confidentiality obligation
may not be the socio-economic good it is often presumed to be.39
Policy considerations aside, confidentiality is not as clear a concept
as it may seem. In fact, it is a fairly distorted notion in different
arbitrating systems. For instance, the International Chamber of
Commerce's Rules of Arbitration mandate that "persons not involved in
the proceedings shall not be admitted," but no general provisions for
34. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 14; Claude R. Thomson & Annie M. K. Finn,
Confidentiality in Arbitration: A Valid Assumption? A Proposed Solution!, DISP. RESOL. J., MayJuly 2007, at 75, 75-76 ("Most parties to arbitration assume that the private nature of the process
will ensure that the evidence, the proceedings and the award will be kept private and
confidential .... [These parties] would be surprised to learn that the assumption of confidentiality
may not always be valid.").
35. Gu, supra note 8, at 617.
36. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 14 n.3 I.
37. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Cook, Comment, The Evolution of Investment-State Dispute
Resolution in NAFTA and CAFTA: Wild West to World Order, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1085, 1100-01
(2007).
38. Brown, supra note 8, at 1019 (arguing that the realities of the current system make
protection of confidentiality a "wasted effort"); Gu, supra note 8, at 617. "[C]onfidentiality will
never be absolute: a small circle of people will be aware of the award, and that circle will grow[,]
[especially] if the award gives rise to litigation before the courts and thereby becomes public."
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 188
(Emmanual Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
39. Brown, supra note 8, at 10 17-19 (listing arguments against the duty of confidentiality,
such as danger of inconsistent awards and duplicative efforts of lawyers and arbitrators, not to
mention the tremendous importance of predictability and certainty to efficient conducting of
business). However, it is possible that "[tlhe cure [of publishing arbitral awards] may be worse than
the disease." Delissa A. Ridgway, International Arbitration: The Next Growth Industry, DisP.
RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 50, 52.
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confidentiality during the proceedings exist. 40 Similarly, the Arbitration

Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") require that "[h]earings should be held in camera" but
give the tribunal wide discretion to exclude witnesses from the
proceedings during the testimony of other witnesses.4 1 Likewise, the
United States Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 42 does not contain any
provisions requiring parties or arbitrators to keep secret the arbitration
proceedings in which they are involved.4 3 However, the International
Dispute Resolution Procedures of the AAA and the International Centre
for Dispute Resolution ("ICDR") provide unusually strict institutional
rules preventing disclosure of the awards or the identities of the parties.""
Similarly, under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") Rules, an award can only be made public with the
consent of the parties.45 Still opposite to ICSID, arbitral awards by the
World Trade Organization are published practically without exception
upon request of a member of the tribunal.4 6 The Swiss Rules of
International Arbitration, however, contain a provision for

40. ICC Rules of Arbitration art. 21 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Arbitration], available
at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules arb-english.pdf. A provision
for confidentiality is stipulated only for the internal proceedings of the ICC International Court of
Arbitration. Id. at app. 11,art. 1.
41. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 25.4, U.N. GAOR, 31st Session,
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rues/arb-rules.pdf.
42. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
43. See id. It follows that, unless contracted otherwise, participants are not actually required
under United States law to keep confidential the arbitration proceedings. See Industrotech
Constructors Inc. v. Duke Univ., 314 S.E.2d 272, 274 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
44. International Dispute Resolution Procedures art. 34 (2008), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994&printable-true. Under these Procedures, parties are bound by
Article 34, which states that "[c]onfidential information disclosed during the proceedings by the
parties or by witnesses shall not be divulged by an arbitrator or by the administrator. Except as
provided in Article 27, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or required by applicable law, the
members of the tribunal and the administrator shall keep confidential all matters relating to the
arbitration or the award." Id. Article 27(8), in turn, states that "[u]nless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the administrator may publish or otherwise make publicly available selected awards,
decisions and rulings that have been edited to conceal the names of the parties and other identifying
details or that have been made publicly available in the course of enforcement or otherwise." Id. at
art. 27(8).
45. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules R. 48(4) (2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.
46. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 art. 18(2), Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at
http:llwww.wto.orglenglish/docs.e/legal-e128-dsu.pdf.
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confidentiality of an award and materials submitted
in the course of
47
proceedings unless there is a duty to disclose.
In addition, arbitrating parties may fail to distinguish between
48
confidentiality at the proceedings stage and at the enforcement stage.
While parties are free to demand privacy and confidentiality as long as
the proceedings and institutional rules allow them to do so,
confidentiality is compromised to a certain extent because the
enforcement of awards occurs in national courts. 49 It is true that courts
rarely, if ever, engage in substantive review of a dispute and rather focus
primarily on the compliance of the proceedings with the New York
Convention. 50 Nevertheless, once an award is taken to the enforcement
stage, the precedent, with some reasoning and disclosure of facts, is
invariably created regardless of the parties' initial agreement as to the
confidentiality of the proceedingi'
While the above caveats are necessary, lightly doing away with
confidentiality is nevertheless not a solution. 52 Regardless of the
changing nature of the core elements of international arbitration,
confidentiality is still expected and desired (as are the other traditional
elements).53 It is only natural that in arbitration, which is purely a
creature of contract, the guarantee of confidentiality should also be
contractually delineated and as such remain one of the most attractive
characteristics of arbitration for commercial parties seeking to keep
sensitive business information out of the public eye. 4 As the following
Parts discuss, dramatically altering the nature of arbitration in the name

47. Swiss Rules of International Arbitration art. 43 (2006), available at
http://www.swissarbitration.ch/rules.php.
48. While awards are rendered in private arbitration proceedings, post-award compliance can
take place in a multitude of ways: voluntary compliance, renegotiation, settlement, or court action
(in which case a nation's judicial system becomes involved in the process). Naimark & Keer, PostAward, supra note 17, at 96.
49. See Brown, supra note 8, at 1019.
50. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The New York
Convention, adopted in 1958, is the most widely adopted convention on arbitration. Molly Zohn,
Filling the Void: InternationalLegal Structures and Political Risk in Investment, 31 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 230, 255 (2007).

51. Brown, supra note 8, at 1019.
52. See Thomson & Finn, supra note 34, at 78. "A fundamental basis for agreeing to
arbitration rather than to litigation in public courts is to preserve privacy and confidentiality to the
greatest extent possible." Id.
53.

See id.

54. "Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process in which the arbitrators and rules are
selected by the parties. In principle, there is no reason why business people should not be able to
resolve their commercial disputes in a private and confidential matter." Id.
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of fairness, justice, predictability, or public policy poses the risk of
forcing judicial standards on arbitration to such extent that the
mechanism that has instilled confidence in commercial parties for
decades will cease to exist.
III.

IS INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FAIR ENOUGH?

The demand for fairness and justice deserves recognition. As some
researchers argue, it is the single most important core element that
participants value in international commercial arbitration.55 The fairness
and justice of the process is not equivalent to a winning result-in fact,
fairness and justice invariably ranked higher than a winning result in
Naimark and Keer's survey. 6 They argue that "[e]ven for the cynic who
believes that parties want only to win the case, winning would be
included in the concept of substantive justice, whereas procedural justice
(getting a result in the 'right way') provides a whole other dimension to
the goal of the parties. 57 Simply winning is unlikely to place fairness
and justice overwhelmingly on top of the list of desired characteristics.
Had it been the primary attraction, "winning" would be listed as the top
factor. Getting the result in the "right way" speaks more strongly to the
participants in international arbitrations and, save the understanding of
just and fair result as simply winning, such result may be understood as
an award reached through adherence to just and fair procedures.58
The requirement of fairness is not foreign to model laws and
countries' legislations. Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law states
directly that all "parties shall be treated with equality. 59 This
requirement may be interpreted as an opportunity to determine and
implement a procedure that will give each party equal opportunity to
arrive at a result that all parties, winners and losers, consider the most
just possible result under the circumstances. More realistically, however,
the requirement may mean simply that all parties are given equal chance
for a hearing.6 °
Principles of International Commercial Contracts ("Principles"),
promulgated by the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law ("UNIDROIT"), are also clear on the requirement of fairness in
55. Naimark & Keer, supra note 1, at 203.
56. Id. at 205.
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 18 (1994).
60.

See MATI S. KURKELA, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

448 (2005).
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arbitration proceedings. 61 Article 1.7 states in section one that "[e]ach
party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in
international trade" and adds in section two that "parties may not
exclude or limit duty."62 However, the private nature of arbitration
cannot be lightly subjected to the pursuit of fairness based on the
Principles, when all that the Principles in fact require is a duty of good
faith.
Internationally recognized principles of human rights naturally have
a significant influence on the processes and awards in international
commercial arbitration proceedings. The concept of a "fair... hearing"
is codified in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR") 63 and is virtually identical in various regional and universal
instruments. 64 In essence, these provisions guarantee not only access to a
hearing, but also justice that includes such qualities as: compliance with
requirements of impartiality, independence, and ending the matter within
a reasonable time frame.6 5 Thus, by agreeing to arbitration, parties do
not forgo their right to court access and do not subject themselves to a
violation of human rights in giving up a right to request a hearing in
which the ECHR principles are implied.66 On the contrary, parties to
arbitration substitute their right to a hearing in court with a right to a
hearing in a different forum, and they do so through carefully negotiated
contract terms in the interest of business necessity.67
A significant concern of critics and supporters of arbitration alike is
the autonomy that arbitrators exercise in rendering non-reviewable, non-

61. For a discussion of the UNIDROIT Principles, see Klaus Peter Berger, International
Arbitral Practiceand the UNIDROIT Principles of InternationalCommercial Arbitration,46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 129, 149 (1998) (suggesting that UNIDROIT Principles "have furnished arbitrators with a
perfect and eminently practical tool for their comparative decision-making").
62. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts art. 1.7 (2004), available at
http://www'unidroit'org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
63. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC134318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ EnglishAnglais.pdf.
64. See e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7(1), June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217; American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica art. 8(1), Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144.
65.

GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS,

PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

11

(2004).
66. Seeid. at112-14.
67. See Juan Eduardo Figueroa Valdfs, The Principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in
InternationalCommercialArbitration,MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. RPT., May 2007, at 29, 29.
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appealable decisions. 68 However, by virtue of well-established
arbitration processes, fairness is already served sufficiently by the
imposition of a variety of duties and limitations on arbitrators. 69 The
specificity of these duties, which are easy to understand even for those
arbitrators who are merely "commercial men, 7 ° with little or no
exposure to the practice of law, ensures that sufficient attention is paid to
the integrity of the process from within and that it is safeguarded from
abuse by an arbitrator. 7'
Alternative dispute resolution, and particularly arbitration, is
arguably a far better-suited forum for achievement of procedural justice
than is litigation, since arbitration is primarily concerned with dispute
resolution, "peace-keeping," consensus-building, and preservation of the
contractual relationship.7 2 The importance of fairness and justice may be
significantly lessened in the adversarial system of litigation where
winning at any cost, even the cost of a continuing relationship, is a
primary goal of the parties involved.7 3 From this, there seems to be a
logical progression to the understanding that a less rigorous safeguarding
of fairness in arbitration that involves parties with equal bargaining
power who are dealing at arms-length 74 will achieve superior results in
comparison to the mechanisms
of appeal, review, and transparency
75
rendered in litigation.
68. See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral
Autonomy, 16 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 213 (2005) (discussing the various implications of arbitrator
autonomy and the steps that have been taken to remedy such problems as arbitrator partiality).
69. Moreover, ascertaining the fairness and justice of an award in arbitration is as much a
duty of arbitrators as it is a duty of juries and judges in litigation. Jonathan M. Hyman, Swimming in
the Deep End: Dealingwith Justice in Mediation, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 19,38 (2004).
70. W.K. Webster & Co. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing the definition of the term and allowing consideration of attorneys as "commercial
men").
71. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 81-89 (discussing arbitrators' duties of competency
and impartiality, duty to render a decision, duty to uphold the integrity and fairness of the
proceeding, duty of disclosure, duty to communicate, duty to act professionally, and duty to act in a
fiduciary manner); REDFERN ET AL., supranote 11,at 238-48 (discussing duties imposed by the law,
duties imposed by parties, and ethical duties, as well as duty of care, duty to act with diligence, and
duty to act judicially); Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethicsfor Commercial Arbitrators:
Basic Principles and Emerging Standards,5 Wyo. L. REV. 453,456-67 (2005).
72. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-First
Century: PursuingPeaceas Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1763-64 (2002).
73. See e.g., Alford, supranote 8, at 82-83; Menkel-Meadow, supranote 72, at 1763-64.
74. See Rogers, supra note 14, at 341; Jean R. Sterlight, Introduction: Dreaming About
ArbitrationReform, 8 NEV. L.J. 1, 7 (2007).
75. See KURKELA, supra note 60, at 7; Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration:
Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2006) ("[A]rbitration policy [must] steer a
middle path, one that respects both the justice system's need for relevant evidence and the need of
parties in arbitration to a reliable level of confidentiality.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss4/13

12

Japaridze: Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice with
2008]

PRESERVING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

1427

Arbitration has long been the preferred method of dispute
resolution for the business community, aimed at minimizing the
involvement with the judicial system and its procedural roadblocks and
maintaining contractual relationships in order to do what the business
community does best-conduct business-instead of spending money
and resources litigating in court.76 For that reason, arbitral institutions,
conventions, and model laws have developed a vast body of procedural
rules and limitations designed to assure the business public that they
would be receiving an award of certain quality-one achieved in
compliance with definitive rules and rendered by experienced persons
deeply familiar with a subject matter and the interests of the arbitrating
parties.77 Assuming that such existing rules and limitations provide
sufficiently satisfactory quality of justice and fairness in arbitration,
further imposition by the legal community of judicial standards of
fairness on arbitration may provide a debilitating disservice to the
business community for whose needs arbitration was developed. Part IV
will discuss the presence of safeguards to fairness and justice in all
aspects of arbitration and will conclude that additional extraneous
restrictions seeking to achieve the transparent justice of judicial quality
is unsuitable and detrimental to the practice of international commercial
arbitration.
IV. IMPOSITION OF EXTRANEOUS STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS IS
NEITHER POSSIBLE NOR NECESSARY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
78
Between the critics and proponents of "privatiz[ing] justice'
through international commercial arbitration, the answer to several
simple questions would probably settle the issue. First, is the pursuit of
justice in the grand sense, in a way modeled after the judicial system and
complete with a system of review, appeal, and transparency fit for
arbitration? In the unlikely event that the private nature of arbitration
and the public nature of fairness can somehow be reconciled, the next
question arises. Is such a pursuit even necessary, or can the well
established processes in arbitration guarantee a sufficient degree of
fairness capable of satisfying participating parties? The discussion that

76. See William H. Knull, III& Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International
Arbitration:Is It Time for an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531,537 (2000).

77. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
78. Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form ArbitrationAgreements, 8 NEV. L.J. 37,
38(2007).
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follows attempts to shed light on arbitration as a process that, without
additional intervention, ensures fair and just arbitral procedures. This
Part concludes by answering in the negative both of the above questions.
One example to illustrate the tension is in order. Treatment of
challenges by the ICC raises debate as to the fact that the ICC does not
provide reasoning for overturning or upholding challenged awards.79
However, it is the firm position of the ICC that its procedures are
sufficient to ensure fair review and to render a just decision without
providing parties with reasons for the decision, because discussion
continues until a consensus is reached and a vote is rarely required. 0
Thus, a decision is not based on one line of reasoning but on many that
eventually result in a consensus.8 1 The ICC believes that giving reasons
for its decision would provide a "straight road to state court" because a
party would be able to raise a challenge concerning "something the ICC
did not consider, such as bad faith or dilatory tactics. 8 2 The policy of
the ICC with respect to challenges is an excellent example of a situation
where the existing procedures in an arbitral institution serve their
intended purpose without the need to be shaped by parallel standards
applicable in litigation. Such examples lead to the conclusion that the
imposition of judicial standards of fairness on arbitral procedures will
dilute its appeal and compromise its benefits to the business community.
Another example serves to show that arbitral procedures evolve in
response to demands of the arbitrating public and are thus continuously
viable and attractive to commercial parties. There are no set and
established rules of evidence in arbitration that are of the magnitude of
those available in litigation.8 3 However, "nothing is further from fairness
than for a party to be right but being unable to prove it due to the lack of
evidentiary procedures. '8 4 To alleviate this danger, arbitral practice is
rich with evidentiary norms suitable for the nature of arbitration.85 Such
norms include "obligation of cooperation,' 8 6 negative inferences,8 7 and
79. Katherine Gonzalez Arrocha, Director, ICC Dispute Resolution Services, Latin America,
Welcoming Remarks at International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: The ICC
Perspective Conference (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Me. Jean Robert, Administrationof Evidence in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, I
Y.B. Com. Arb. 221,221 (1976).
84. Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Evidence in International Arbitration, International
Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: The ICC Perspective Conference (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file
with author).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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arbitrator authority (arbitrator's ability to request, sua sponte, documents
if parties did not refer to them, and did not include them in affidavits).88
Additionally, several years ago it would be very unusual for a tribunal to
compel a party to produce a document that was harmful to their case. 89
This is changing in the name of efficiency and fairness. Now, if the
requesting party can make an argument that the other party is in the
possession of the document, the arbitral tribunal can request
production.9"
Fairness and justice are present in the international commercial
arbitration process as a combination of many elements that developed in
response to the demands and needs of the arbitrating public for fair and
enforceable awards. 9' But for the perception that arbitration is an
optimal, fair, and effective process of dispute resolution in the business
setting, arbitration would have been unable to achieve such wide and
growing "buy-in., 92 The following sub-Parts discuss the trends and
elements in various aspects of arbitration that demonstrate the abundant
pursuit of fairness embedded in arbitration-specific processes.
A.

The Proceduraland Substantive Justice in Arbitration

In litigation, the judicial system reviews decisions on both
procedural and substantive grounds, depending on the posture of the
case. On the contrary, arbitration awards are rarely, if ever, challenged
and reviewed on substantive grounds and when they are set aside, it is
almost exclusively on procedural grounds.9 3 For instance, grounds upon
which an award may be vacated under the FAA all have to do with
87. If one party refuses to submit sufficient evidence, the tribunal may make inferences
against the recalcitrant party. Id.; Kathleen Paisley, Commencement of the Arbitration and Conduct
of the Arbitration, 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 107, 137 (1998) (Where a party fails to produce
documents without good cause, a tribunal will likely infer that the documents provided information
against that party's interest.).
88. Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Gilberto Giusti, Remarks on Issues on Documentary Evidence in International
Arbitration, at International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: The ICC Perspective
Conference (Nov. 4, 2007) (on file with author). As arbitrators only expect parties to disclose
written materials that support their case, there is very limited use of presumption and/or adverse
inferences as decisive tools. To request documents in the possession of the other party, it is
necessary to specify the documents sought and prove that the other party has the documents. Id.
91. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule
of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 337,371-72 (2007).
92. Id. (discussing "buy-in" in the foreign investment context as the attraction and reliance of
commercial parties on international arbitration).
93. Indeed, appellate arbitral review on the merits is rare. See Knull & Rubins, supra note 76,
at 531.
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misconduct, misbehavior, and partiality of arbitrators, or unethical
behavior by the parties. 94 In addition to the statutory grounds that require
very specific conduct by the arbitrators or the parties, 95 case law allows
for substantive review and vacatur of an award only when arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law in reaching the decision.9 6 Even while the
standard of manifest disregard of the law perhaps lends itself to more indepth review than the available statutory grounds, the permitted judicial
review is still very limited to such obvious mistakes that it does not
warrant in-depth exploration of the grounds upon which the decision was
reached.97 Thus, the just and fair result in arbitration can be seen as
largely based upon the recognition by the parties and the arbitrators of
the importance and characteristics of just procedures and adherence to
these procedures.
Such an obvious difference is certain to raise questions among
critics of arbitration as to the ability to truly guarantee fairness of the
process without an avenue for substantive review and only a limited
avenue for procedural review by the judiciary (or an appellate arbitral
body). However, the examples that follow demonstrate that the existing
procedures for ensuring procedural fairness are not only comprehensive
and effective, but are successful in achieving the degree and quality of
justice suited for the private, business-oriented nature of international
commercial arbitration. Given that arbitration aims at speed and
efficiency, substantive review is unsuitable for an arbitration award and
the limited judicial review of compliance with established procedures
reflects the desire of the arbitrating public to settle disputes "efficiently

94. The FAA sets out the bases upon which an award may be vacated as follows:
(a) ....
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced.
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to
be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
95. See id.
96. Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993).
97. See supra Part Ill.
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and avoid long and expensive litigation." 98 That goal fails if extensive
substantive review is undertaken and arbitration becomes "merely the
first step in lengthy litigation." 99
1. Due Process Safeguards
A widely discussed topic in modem international arbitration is the
tension between due process rights and the private nature of
arbitration. 100 Critics of arbitral autonomy would posit that, while
arguably a private process, arbitration still has to be subject to some
extent of due process protection. 1 1 However, the involvement of public
courts at the enforcement stage guarantees that an award is reviewed
with due process requirements. 10 2 But what about the awards that are
either voluntarily complied with or settled without judicial
enforcement? 10 3 And even beyond that, are there processes inherent in
international commercial arbitration which can provide a guarantee of
due process comparable to that of domestic constitutional guarantees
present in the judicial system but suited for the unique nature of
international arbitration?
The New York Convention provides some answers with its explicit
due process guidelines. Specifically, Article V(1)(b) allows for refusal of
enforcement of an award on the grounds that a party "was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator, or of the arbitration
proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present [its] case."' 1 4 This is an
opportunity for a party to be heard when it was denied a fair hearing or
due process, when, for instance, the tribunal failed to treat the parties
equally. 10 5 These defenses are intended precisely to safeguard the parties
against injustice and to serve a function similar to that of due process
guarantees in litigation.'0 6 However, there is little reason to understand

98.

Folkways, 989 F.2d at I11.

99. Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Mgmt. Co., 597 F.2d 819, 825 (2d Cir. 1979).
100. KURKELA, supra note 60, at 7, 35-64.
101. Seeid. at36.
102. See Reuben, supra note 75, at 1282.
103. See Phillip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1999); Naimark & Keer, Post
Award, supra note 17, at 96.

104. New York Convention, supra note 50, at art. V(1)(b).
105. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 104; William W. (Rusty) Park, Award Enforcement
Under the New York Convention, in I INTERNATIONAL BUStNESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 573,

587 (2003) ("[This] first group of defenses includes an invalid arbitration agreement, lack of
opportunity to present one's case, arbitrator excess of jurisdiction and irregular composition of the
arbitral tribunal.").
106.

See id. at 587.
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these functions as an invitation to import judicial or constitutional
standards of due process. 107
Additionally, a current trend in international arbitration is toward
multi-party arbitration, encouraging the inclusion of all parties involved
in the transaction in the full hearing by the tribunal. 10 8 As courts
traditionally may be restrictive toward inclusion of third parties, multicontract arbitration leads to efficiency, inclusion of all relevant parties
and facts, subsequent improvement in consideration of due process and,
ultimately, more fairness in arbitral proceedings.10 9 While multi-party
arbitration can create and complicate due process issues by introducing
additional parties and evidence, it is still one of the important trends in
modern international commercial arbitration that serves the needs of the
commercial public by creating arbitration-specific procedures and
maintaining the viability of the process. 0
2. Role of Arbitrators
Arbitrator impartiality and independence are the cornerstones of
procedural justice in arbitration due to, among other things, the
autonomy that the parties enjoy in choosing the arbitrator and the very
limited review to which arbitrators' decisions may be subjected.111 Thus,
a multitude of rules and restrictions exist in arbitration, guaranteeing that
arbitrators entrusted with rendering a virtually final award are impartial
and independent. Impartiality certainly does not stem from an
arbitrator's lack of familiarity with the industry, the subject matter, or
even the parties' business. 1 2 In fact, arbitrators are often chosen for their
exposure to and expert knowledge of the specific area of industry and
trade out of which the dispute arises. 113 Rather, impartiality and
independence are a state of mind that allow the arbitrator to conduct
proceedings even-handedly and to reach a judgment solely on the basis

107.

See id. at 587-88.

108. Jose Ricardo Feris, Counsel, Secretariat of the International Court of Arbitration,
"International Arbitration: Current Trends" panel at International Commercial Arbitration in Latin

America: The ICC Perspective Conference (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
109. Id.
110. Fabiola Medina Games, ICC International Court of Arbitration, Tendecias del Arbitraje
Internacional en los paises del DR-CAFTA at International Commercial Arbitration in Latin

America: The ICC Perspective Conference (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
11l. See Susan D. Franck, The Role ofInternationalArbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
499, 504-12 (2006).
112. See PETROCHILOS,supra note 65, at 131-32.
113. Id.at 132.
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of relevant facts and law without preference or bias to either party 114
precisely what is required of the arbitrator in achieving the result that is
both procedurally and, more likely than not, substantively just. In
achieving such a just award, an effective system of selection of neutral
arbitrators decreases undue delays, challenges, and the setting aside of
the awards.'15
To that end, and despite the fact that arbitration is clearly distinct
from litigation, arbitrators are under a duty to act judicially." 16 This is a
clear but careful import of judicial standards into the process of
arbitration, conducted with care so as not to compromise the nature of
arbitration. The arbitrator's duty to act judicially includes, for example,
the duty to respect the rules of due process-an obligation more binding
than a mere norm of morality.' 17 This duty extends to all aspects of the
proceedings and is acknowledged by the UNCITRAL Model Law" 18 and
the ICC Rules.' 19
In addition to the duty to act judicially, arbitrators may be bound by
duties imposed by parties.120 This opportunity is especially valuable to a
party concerned with arbitrator autonomy and uncertain that an arbitrator
will be sufficiently impartial and just. Parties may stipulate specific
duties they wish to impose upon an arbitrator in their arbitration
114. Id.; see also TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 265-66 (3d ed. 2006) (Explaining that neutrality and impartiality are

not synonymous, but rather neutrality is a sign or indication of likely impartiality. Neutrality is often
discussed in two aspects: personal, supposing the absence of family or business ties to the dispute,
and general, relating to group affiliation, such as nationality, religion, or ethnic background. Parties
are usually sensitive to both aspects of neutrality in assessing an arbitrator's impartiality.).
115. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
Controversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 65 (1995).
116.

REDFERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 245-46.

117. Id. at 245.
118. UNCITRAL Rules at Article 15 delineates familiar norms of due process and imposes
them as an affirmative duty upon arbitrators:
1) Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such
manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and
that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting
his case.
2) If either party so requests at any stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal
shall hold hearings for the presentation of evidence by witnesses, including expert
witnesses, or for oral argument. In the absence of such a request, the arbitral tribunal
shall decide whether to hold such hearings or whether the proceedings shall be
conducted on the basis of documents and other materials.
3) All documents or information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by one party shall at
the same time be communicated by that party to the other party.
UNCITRAL Rules, supranote 41, at art. 15.
119. ICC Rules of Arbitration, supranote 40, at art. 15(2).
120. REDFERN ET AL., supranote 11, at 238-39.
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agreement at the contracting stage, and may indicate requirements such
as rendering an award within a certain time frame, adhering to certain
institutional rules, or requiring inspection of a subject of arbitration
(especially relevant in disputes relating to construction contracts). 2'
Moreover, arbitrators may be liable to parties for failure to fulfill duties
stipulated in the arbitration agreement.122
Good faith is also required of arbitrators in international
commercial arbitration. In contract law, good faith is a well-established
principle 123 and is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."'12 4 Indeed, the ICC has
recognized the importance of implying the duty of good faith in its
arbitration proceedings in order to not only create the perception of
fairness and justice of the institution but also achieve the goal providing
just procedure. 125 For instance, Professor William Tetley argues that
good faith is essential for effective arbitration process and award
enforcement.1 26 He defines good faith as "just and honest conduct" and
argues that a clear link exists between good faith conduct and a just
result to the extent that "[a]rbitration without good faith is not a viable
alternative to proceeding before the courts.' 27
Another duty essential to the guarantee of a just process is the duty
of loyalty that compels parties to act in a way to preserve the viability of

121. Id. (In discussing the ability of parties to impose a wide variety of duties upon arbitrators,
the authors indicate that arbitrators must familiarize themselves with an arbitration agreement prior
to accepting an appointment in order to ensure their ability to comply with all party imposed
duties.).
122. Id. at 240. The duty is strong in Argentina, where arbitrators may be held liable for costs
and damages in case of non-performance of their duties, whereas in England liability may be
imposed only through a finding of bad faith. Id. at 241.
123. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1979).
124. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2005). For further discussion of good faith in contract law, see
Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (arguing that a party that goes after opportunities
forgone by entering into the contract in question acts in bad faith) and Robert S. Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 820
(1982) (suggesting that a definition of good faith is best determined by conduct that is excluded
rather than through a structured definition).
125. ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 40, at art. 15(2).
126. William Tetley, Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and
Chartering, 35 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 561, 561 (2004) ("Viable arbitration requires that each party be in
good faith; otherwise multiple proceedings, the questioning of every point of law, unnecessary
procedures and appeals, inordinate delays and the resulting high costs only result in failure to arrive
at a just solution in a reasonable time.").
127. Id. at 563,615.
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the contract. 128 Lastly, the duty to uphold the integrity and fairness of the
proceeding speaks directly to arbitrators' strong obligation to ensure the
and produce an award in compliance
fairness of the arbitral proceeding
29
1
fairness.
requisite
with
This sampling of arbitrator duties demonstrates that the arbitral
process has developed safeguards against arbitrator abuse of discretion
and lack of care.1 30 The contention of the critics that these safeguards are
not sufficient when pitted against arbitrator immunity is certainly worth
considering. 31 However, this may be precisely the situation where the
considerations specific to the commercial and private nature of
arbitration are evidence that "controlled immunity" of arbitrators is
maintained, instead of exposing arbitrators to liability beyond mere noncompliance with explicit duties. Indeed, one of the primary benefits of
arbitration-finality of the award-would be completely compromised if
the losing party to the arbitration could sue the arbitrator on a host of
non-compliance or lack of care causes of action. 13 2 Additionally, few
arbitrators would be willing to take up the responsibility of arbitrating a
dispute if their exercise of professional expertise and arbitral skill could
easily expose them to liability. 33 Ironically, immunity (albeit, partial)
may be one of the elements borrowed from the judicial system that is fit
for application in international arbitration. However, as discussed above,
while serving necessary practical needs, the immunity is severely limited
134
by duties and safeguards imposed by parties, institutions, and the law.
3. The Substantively "Fair Result"
In arbitration, disputes are generally heard and determined with the
assumption that the parties' primary goal is preservation of the

128. Larry A. Dimatteo et al., An Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of
Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 299, 316-17 (2004).
129. Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 71, at 458-59. Specifically, arbitrators are under a duty to
prevent delaying tactics, harassment of the parties, and other disruptions. Id. More importantly,
arbitrators must maintain impartiality and appearance thereof by avoiding any financial, business,
professional, family, or social relationship with interested parties or their counsels. Id.
130. Duty of care is essentially implied in the duty of competency and ability to devote the
requisite time and resources to arbitration. Id. at 457.
131. Knull & Rubins, supra note 76, at 533, 564; McConnaughay, supra note 103, at 453.
132. REDFERN ET AL., supranote 11, at 242.
133. Id. at241.
134. Additional and more self-explanatory duties, beyond the ones discussed in the text, are the
duty of competency, duty of independence and impartiality, duty of disclosure, duty to
communicate, duty to act professionally, duty to render a decision, and duty to act in a fiduciary
manner. GARNETT, supra note 24, at 81-89; Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 71, at 457-65.
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relationship and contract continuation. 135 Substantive "correctness" is
rarely discussed even at non-confidential stages (such as enforcement) in
a traditional international commercial arbitration. 136 It is widely
recognized that substantive review of an award is less critical to ensuring
the validity of such award and the focus is largely on procedural
fairness. 137 Indeed, many arbitrating parties and attorneys may
incorrectly believe that arbitration is to be resolved in accordance with
principles of substantive law. 138 Enforcement involves139
procedural review
even though it ensures that the award becomes public.
However, even in the regime where review is primarily focused on
procedural issues, substantive review is not a black hole into which
fairness may be lost. In some extreme cases, although not universally, an
arbitral award may be overturned if the enforcing court finds a "manifest
disregard of the law." 140 Thus, the situations of egregious behavior that
are not corrected by the many procedural safeguards will be corrected at
the enforcement stage through a substantive review for manifest
disregard of the law. Critics of the theory of manifest disregard argue
that it has little place in arbitration and, due to its non-statutory nature
and vague origins, has become a "repository for all sorts of outlandish
theories of arbitral misconduct, devised with but one aim in mind: the
application of standards of appellate review to the arbitration process,
and ultimately, to vacatur of a particular arbitral award."' 14 1 While
manifest disregard may not be a precise concept, its presence in
arbitration combined with the narrow grounds of its application provides
for an additional safeguard against arbitrator abuse-if all else failswithout completely subjecting arbitral awards to judicial review.
Lastly, the segregation of the substantive and the procedural law
applicable to the dispute is a widely recognized cardinal element of
international arbitration and is itself a safeguard against abuse of justice

135. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 1763.
136. See supranotes 95-99 and accompanying text.
137. Levin, supra note 16, at 108.
138. Id. at 107.
139. See McConnaughay, supra note 103, at 468-69.
140. Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard,8 NEv. L.J. 234, 235 (2007). "A
party seeking to establish manifest disregard of the law sufficient to warrant setting aside an arbitral
award must demonstrate that the arbitrators appreciated the existence and applicability of a
controlling legal rule but intentionally decided not to apply it." Id. (citing Cytyc Corp. v. Deka
Prods. Ltd., 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006)).
141.

Marta B. Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard,DisP. RESOL. J.,

June 1994, at 64, 65.
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in arbitral proceedings.1 42 This insulation illuminates the fact that the
arbitral process is independent of the system of law that regulates the
rights and obligations of the parties in regard to their substantive
agreement. 43 This allows for the arbitrators applying the law that parties
chose to govern the procedure of their dispute to focus solely upon the
proper, just, and fair application of the rules, independent of the factual
substance of the dispute. 144
4. The Appearance of Fairness
Arbitrators' established duty to uphold the integrity and fairness of
the proceeding1 45 is not merely a duty to arbitrate fairly but also to give
the appearance of doing so. 146 While an arbitrator is naturally required to
exercise his authority completely and to comply with all the provisions
that no
of the agreement and the institutional rules, it is also essential
"appearance of bias," impropriety, or partiality is created. 147
As the IBA rules indicate, the appearance that fairness and justice is
vigorously pursued by arbitrating authorities is no less important to the
spread and legitimacy of international arbitration than the pursuit itself.
Thus, a functional system needs to have a thorough understanding of
what spells out fairness and justice for the participants. Perhaps the fact
that parties participate in international commercial arbitration at an
142. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation [1970] A.C.
572, 573 (H.L.) (U.K.) (Although the parties agreed that the arbitration would be governed by
English law, French law governed the substance of the dispute due to the fact that it was more
closely connected with the contract.); see GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 5.
143.

OKEZIE

CHUKWUMERIJE,

CHOICE

OF

LAW

IN INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 77 (1994). An international commercial arbitration dispute can potentially involve
four levels of law:
(1) the law applicable to the arbitration agreement... (2) the law applicable to the
reference, which governs the individual reference to arbitration; (3) the law applicable to
the arbitration proceedings, which regulates the conduct of the arbitration proceedings;
and (4) the law applicable to the substance of the dispute, which determines the rights
and obligations of the parties in relation to their substantive contract.
Id. at 77.
144. See GARNETT ET AL., supranote 24, at 4-5.
145. Id. at 83.
146. International Bar Association Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators R. 2-3 (1986),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/pubs/Ethics arbitrators.pdf [hereinafter IBA
Rules of Ethics]; GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 83.

147.
Facts which might lead a reasonable person, not knowing the arbitrator's true state of
mind, to consider that he is dependent on a party create an appearance of bias. The same
is true if an arbitrator has a material interest in the outcome of the dispute, if he has
already taken a position in relation to it. The appearance of bias is best overcome by full
disclosure.
IBA Rules of Ethics, supra note 146, at R. 3.2.
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increasing rate means that they perceive fairness and justice is present. Is
it safe to assume that the increasing popularity of commercial arbitration
is a sign that fairness is being achieved? Can we further assume it is
what the parties want and the trends discussed above as evidence of
fairness and justice are indeed working?
These trends are only the few examples of where a careful balance
between arbitral idiosyncrasies and the pursuit of fairness and justice has
been worked out by years of practice. Such examples abound and the
increasing popularity and appeal of international arbitration to
commercial actors is clear evidence that this method of dispute
resolution is serving the needs of the arbitrating public well. The
following Part builds upon the importance of imposing duties on
arbitrators which contribute tremendously to the guarantee of fairness in
arbitration.
B. Ethics ofArbitration
In addition to specific duties imposed on arbitrators by the parties
or by the law, arbitrators are bound by certain moral and ethical
obligations. 48 This is an additional safeguard against arbitrator abuse of
discretion and an additional assurance to a skeptical party that the
arbitral process is conducted with integrity and accountability. One of
these duties, as mentioned above, is preemptive in that arbitrators may
time and
not accept a nomination if they lack expertise or requisite
49
resources necessary to conduct the arbitration properly. 1
Commentators have argued about consolidation of various ethical
obligations in different arbitrating forums into some form of an
internationally accepted "code of conduct."' 150 This was achieved in the
United States where the American Arbitration Association/American
Bar Association ("AAA/ABA") Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes' 5 ' was introduced in 1977 and modified in

148.

REDFERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 246; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in

Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U.

MIAMI L. REV. 949, 951 (2002).
149. Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 71, at 457.
150.
151.

REDFERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 246.
AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004),

available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes/pdf;

Bruce Meyerson & John M.

Townsend, Revised Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators Explained, DISP. RESOL. J.,Feb.-

Apr. 2004, at 10, 1I.
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2004.152 The international equivalent of the AAA/ABA Rules is the IBA
Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 53 and IBA Guidelines on
Conflict of Interests.1 54 Additionally, the FAA and The New York
Convention have a universal standard for vacating an award on the basis
of an ethical violation. 155 The ICC Rules of Arbitration also156require
arbitrator independence and adherence to the institutional rules.
Commentators agree that arbitration, and alternative dispute
resolution in general, is an integral (albeit, distinct) part of the judicial
landscape and, as ethical norms go a long way toward ensuring just and
fair judicial decisions, such norms must play an equally important role in
rendering arbitral awards. 157 A pursuit of justice through rigorous ethical
rules is an effective way of ensuring the legitimacy of arbitration and
propagating its autonomy.158 As the use and popularity of international
arbitration grows exponentially, the need for definitive ethical standards
is critical for preservation of the legitimacy of the process and fairness of
awards. 159 It is precisely for the determination of the fairness of an award
that uniform ethics rules coined60especially for arbitration but similar to
those in a judicial system exist.'
Recent United States case law on international arbitrator ethics is
particularly useful to illustrate the effective and often stringent ethical
norms by which arbitrators must abide. The case law draws on a vast
body of laws and rules regulating the issues of arbitrator ethics. 161 The
152. One of the main modifications did away with the purely American presumption that
arbitrators are presumed non-neutral and yielded to the international and European presumption of
fully neutral tribunals. Meyerson & Townsend, supra note 151, at 12.
153. IBA Rules of Ethics, supra note 146.
154. IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Commercial Arbitration (2004),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Arbitration-guidelines_2007.pdf.
155. In the United States, the FAA provides a legal standard to vacate award "[w]here there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000).
156. ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 40, at art. 7(1) ("Every arbitrator must be and remain
independent."). An arbitrator must disclose any such facts or circumstances as might call into
question his independence in the eyes of the parties. Id. at art. 7(2).
157. John D. Feerick, The 1977 Code of Ethicsfor Arbitrators:An Outside Perspective, 18 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 907, 908 (2002).
158. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407, 408
(1997) ("It is almost as if we thought that anyone who would engage in ADR must of necessity be a
moral, good, creative, and, of course, ethical person. That we are here today is deeply ironic and yet,
also necessary, as 'appropriate' dispute resolution struggles to define itself and insure its legitimacy
against a variety of theoretical and practical challenges.").
159. Id.
160. Id.
at 409.
161. Do United States arbitration cases matter? According to Louis B. Kimmelman, they do
because of the abundance of situations where foreign parties arbitrate or, more frequently, seek to
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requirement for impartiality is derived directly from the FAA, which
states that a court may vacate an arbitral award upon application by any
party "[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators." 162 The New York Convention also provides for refusal of
enforcement if the arbitral procedure is not conducted in accordance
with the party agreement. 163 The ICC Rules of Arbitration also heavily
influence United States arbitral decisions, especially Article 7(1),
requiring arbitrator independence, and Article 7(2), requiring
disclosure. 164 Applying the FAA, the District Court vacated an award in
Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. when
an arbitrator failed to disclose that at least seven years ago he had been
one of the thirty-four attorneys representing Intel in a prior litigation
along with an attorney representing one of the parties in the arbitration in
question. 165 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacatur on the grounds that
the prior relationship may have conveyed an impression of possible
partiality to a reasonable person. 166 While the Fifth Circuit (en banc)
then reversed the award, deeming the prior relationship "trivial," five
judges dissented from the decision. 67 Such a close decision is clear
evidence that even such remote and arguably trivial indication of
impartiality imposes a danger of vacatur on the award and encourages
close to impeccable impartiality from arbitrators. The same year, a
similarly trivial undisclosed relationship resulted in a vacatur of an

enforce awards in the United States. Louis B. Kimmelman, Recent Developments in Ethical
Considerations in International Arbitration, at International Commercial Arbitration in Latin
America: The ICC Perspective Conference (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
162. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000).
163. New York Convention, supra note 50, at art. V(1)(d). Also relevant here is the
opportunity to challenge an award and hold arbitrators liable for non-compliance with the party
imposed duties. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part III.
165. 476 F.3d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
166. Id. The only United States Supreme Court case to articulate evident partiality is
Commonwealth Coatings Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-50 (1968), which was
decided before the United States' ascension to the New York Convention and is the primary basis
for the interpretation of subsequent cases on arbitrator partiality under the FAA. John Rooney,
Historical Overview of the Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose under United States Federal Arbitration
Law 3, 24 (Nov. 4, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The vagueness of the
United States standard for arbitrator partiality is ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court and,
until then, understanding of the law developed by the lower courts is key to interpretation of the
standard presented in the FAA. Id. at 29; see also New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald
Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1-101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (where, for the first time in United States case law,
facts that might create an impression of bias were sufficient for vacatur).
167. Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 283, 286.
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arbitral award by the Second Circuit. 168 In Applied IndustrialMaterials
Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., an arbitrator failed to
investigate the negotiations his company was involved in with the parent
of one of the parties to the arbitration, as the arbitrator planned not to be
involved in the negotiations.169 The Second Circuit found evident
partiality in the potential business relationship between his company and
one of the parties. 70 Thus, Applied Industrial Materials introduces a
duty to investigate a potential conflict, therefore increasing arbitrator
responsibility to remain impartial and
independent and render decisions
17
compliant with procedural fairness. 1
An even higher standard for arbitrator impartiality is enunciated in
a decision by the Dutch District Court of The Hague, in which an
arbitrator had to resign as counsel to an unrelated party in a proceeding
to annul an award that was introduced as precedent in the arbitration in
question. 72 Another decision that similarly indicates the high threshold
arbitrators must clear to preserve their impartiality and successfully
withstand challenges comes from the Swedish Supreme Court of Appeal
in Stockholm. 173 Relying strongly on the international norms of
arbitrator impartiality, the court decided that the chairman of the arbitral
panel, who was simultaneously a consultant to the law firm that served
the parent company4 of the one of the parties to arbitration, should have
7
been disqualified. 1
If the arbitrators are considered to be the cornerstone of the arbitral
process, the variety and rigor of the duties imposed upon them is to be
expected. More importantly, the severe limitations on the conduct of
arbitrators should be sufficient to convince the staunchest critics that,
while the awards rendered may be non-appealable and colored with the
arbitrator's understanding of the dispute (with which they likely have a
deep familiarity), the safeguards on arbitrator conduct and ethics are
168. Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Oalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132,
139 (2d Cir. 2007).
169. Id. at 135.
170. Id. at 137-39.
171. Id. at 138.
172. Vera van Houtte et al., What's New In European Arbitration?, DIsP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr.
2005, at 6; see Hague DistrictCourt Dismisses Ghana's Challenge ofArbitration, MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP., Jan. 2005, at 7-8; Kluwer Law Int'l Newsletter, http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/
arbitration/Newsletter.aspx?month=december2004 (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
173. Hans Bagner, ArbitratorImpartiality-The End Result, MEALEY'S INTL. ARB. REP., Nov.
2007, at 21. The rarity of such occurrences in Sweden should be noted: Between 1999 and 2007,
only four decisions of the Court of Appeals have been granted the right to an appeal to the Swedish
Supreme Court. Id.
174. Id. at 22.
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optimal and sufficient for the international commercial arbitration
setting.
C. Social Considerationsand PublicPolicy
There is a bias toward enforcing awards under the New York
Convention 75 with the effect that any defenses to enforcement provided
by the Convention are construed narrowly and only accepted in specific
cases. 17 6 For instance, a narrow construction of the public policy
exception 77 to the New York Convention pro-enforcement bias is denial
of enforcement of only such an award that violates the "most basic
notions of morality and justice"'1 8 of the nation where enforcement is
being sought. Similarly, in Argentina, for instance, all arbitral
proceedings and awards, foreign or domestic, must comport with
"essential principles of fairness and justice which are a part of ... public
policy.' ' 179 While rarely applied, the existence of grounds for setting
aside an award based on the enforcing nation's conception of justice
speaks to the arbitrating public's appreciation of the need for awards that
satisfy the legal community and public at large. 180
A more frequently applied exception to enforcement of foreign
81
awards under the New York Convention is set forth in Article V(2)(b)1
175. The New York Convention is the primary legal basis for enforcing awards in international
commercial arbitration. GARNETT ET AL., supranote 24, at 101.
176. See generally ARTHUR JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (1981) (discussing the enforcement of arbitration
awards and the various grounds for refusing enforcement).
177. New York Convention, supra note 50, at art. V(2)(b).
178. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier, 508
F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
179. Horacio A. Grigera Na6n, Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration:An
Argentine View, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION
329, 329 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1987).
180. Paklito Inv. Ltd. v. Klockner E. Asia Ltd., [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 39 (H.C.) (while the court
does not find counsel's public policy relevant, it explicitly endorsed the Parson & Whitmore
standard).
181. The New York Convention, supra note 50, at art. V(2)(b) (recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award may be refused if it would be "contrary to the public policy" of the country where
recognition is sought). Commentators argue that the list of defenses set out in Article V is
exhaustive and there is no residual discretion to refuse award where no ground under Article V is
found. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at I 11. Article V refusal grounds are as follows: (a) An
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or under the law of the
country where the award was made; (b) The party against whom the award is enforced was not
provided with notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or the proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case; (c) The award deals with an inarbitrable matter; (d) The composition of the
arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not agreed to by the parties, or was not in compliance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; (e) The award was set aside or
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and applies when the award violates the public policy of the enforcing
country.1 82 Grounds that have been found to satisfy this provision of the
Convention range from harm to the enforcing countries' national
interests or decisions "obnoxious to internationally accepted
standards." ' 83 Such conduct is present where an award is tainted by
fraud, corruption, involves criminal conduct, or some other
internationally offensive act. 184 Absence of due process or procedural
fairness is arguably the most successful basis for impeaching the award
using the public policy exception, followed by lack of arbitrator
impartiality. 18 However, in terms of arbitrator partiality, only actual bias
(as opposed to the "appearance
of bias") would satisfy the burden under
186
the New York Convention.
Another important ground for refusing enforcement of an award is
the inarbitrability of the subject matter in dispute, but this defense is
likely to be raised at the initial stages in arbitration when parties
challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction to hear a dispute on a certain subject
matter. 187 However, the challenge to the jurisdiction of a tribunal on the
grounds of inarbitrability has become less significant in recent years as
national interests have given way to considerations of uniformity and
international comity. 188 Such relaxation of the inarbitrability limitation
shows the growing deference of the legal and business community to
arbitration and faith in the ability of arbitration to effectively provide fair
1 89
resolutions to such sensitive matters as statutory and antitrust claims.
Nevertheless, the New York Convention retains as an additional

suspended by a competent authority. Enforcement may also be refused if the award is inarbitrable
under the laws of the enforcing country or is contrary to the public policy of that country. New York
Convention, supra note 50, at art. V(1).
182. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d
274, 305-06 (5th Cir. 2004).
183. However, caution is to be exercised not to confuse domestic and international public
policy. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1974). The United States Supreme
Court held that, while matters arising out of domestic securities transactions may not be arbitrated,
when the contract is international, such disputes are arbitrable. Id. at 519-20.
184.

GARNETT ET AL., supranote 24, at 109.

185. Id. at 110.
186. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt. Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 955 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(finding the mere existence of a prior relationship between a party and an arbitrator unlikely to
satisfy the New York Convention standard).
187.

See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 24, at 108.

188. Id. It is repeatedly emphasized in United States case law that the Congressional interest in
encouraging international trade and commerce through arbitration of transnational disputes,
evidenced by the United States' accession to the New York Convention, is to prevail over any
concern that such matters were intended to be specifically reserved for judicial resolution. Id.
189. Levin, supranote 16, at 105-06.
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safeguard, grounds for refusal to enforce an award dealing with a subject
matter that is deemed inappropriate for arbitral dispute resolution and
should be left to national courts. 190
The review of the above safeguards of fairness present in the
processes of international commercial arbitration clearly answered in the
negative the second question presented at the beginning of this Part.
Namely, arbitral processes provide sufficient procedural safeguards to
guarantee a degree of fairness that is satisfactory to the primary users of
international commercial arbitration and, often, the legal community and
the public at large.
The first question-also answered here in the negative-is whether
arbitration can be modeled after a judicial system and still retain its
viability and appeal. Whether or not international commercial arbitration
can be left to develop as a distinct dispute resolution method evolving in
response to the needs of its commercial users or whether it has to yield
to the pressure of the legal community at large and adopt grand
standards of judicial fairness can be reduced to the question of whether
finality in arbitration should be sacrificed to a guaranteed opportunity to
appeal an arbitral award. Finality-the lack of appeal on the merits of
the dispute-and corresponding speed and cost savings, is a recognized
advantage of arbitration over litigation. 19 1 Naturally, critics of arbitral
finality argue that finality is only desirable if arbitrators never made
mistakes.1 92 However, it is not the contention of this Note that the
process of arbitration is flawless or even superior to litigation. It is
merely the more suitable method of dispute resolution in the business
context precisely for its inherent attributes such as finality. The
compromises in judicial precision made in the interests of commercial
expedience are both necessary results of decades of practical application
and are also safeguarded by the multitude of duties and requirements
placed upon arbitrators. 93 Indeed, the principal benefit of international
commercial arbitration is its "lawlessness, its ability because of its
unrestrained flexibility to accommodate the enormous procedural,
presentational, and decisional standard differences that typically exist
among parties to multinational [commercial] transactions.' 94 This is

190. New York Convention, supra note 50, at art. V(2)(a).
191. Knull & Rubins, supra note 76, at 531.
192. James M. Gaitis, Internationaland Domestic ArbitrationProcedure: The Needfor a Rule
Providinga Limited Opportunityfor Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 9, 10-11 (2004); Knull & Rubins, supra note 76, at 531.
193. See supra Part 111.
194. McConnaughay, supra note 103, at 522.
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natural in a process that is contractually established and regulated
according to the rational preference of
commercial parties willingly
195
submitting future disputes to arbitration.
As an additional safeguard to integrity of arbitral awards, both the
UNCITRAL and ICC Rules provide for an opportunity to correct
clerical, typographical, or computational errors.196 Review beyond such
mechanical errors, authorizing the tribunal to alter its determination on
the merits, is incompatible with the nature of international commercial
arbitration.
V.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration is distinct from litigation and should remain that way in
order to preserve its viability and continue serving its indisputably
necessary purpose. Arbitration is an alternative method of dispute
resolution to legal proceedings, following different rules and serving
different ends. Arbitration and litigation "are as distinct in their
elementary structure as dirt is to water. Mixing 1the
two only produces
97
mud-not the sort of stuff we willingly tread in.'
Given the well-developed safeguards for the fairness and integrity
of arbitral awards, the landscape of international arbitration is changing
in response to the needs of its primary users. These changes are effective
and will continue as long as "the current trend toward less interaction
between judge[s] and arbitrator[s] ... reduces judicial meddling in the
legal merits of a dispute."' 98 These changes include improvement of
arbitration-specific procedures that serve the pursuit of fairness and
justice in arbitration but do not and should not include movement
towards the system of mandatory arbitral appeal or towards restricting
the judicial laissez-faireattitude toward arbitration. 99
While the pursuit of fairness and justice is a laudable (and perhaps,
necessary) endeavor, justice as we understand it in a philosophical and
195. Id. at 453 (discussing international commercial arbitration as the resolution of disputes
"within the contractual prerogative of the parties."); Henry P. De Vries, InternationalCommercial
Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 42 (1982)
(International commercial arbitration is "based on contract, rather than on legal norms established
by states for the creation ofjudicial settlement of disputes.").
196. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 41, at art. 36(1); ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 40,
at art. 29(1).
197. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18 (Ct. App. 1999).
198. William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in InternationalArbitration,63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 705 (1989).
199. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in Making of Arbitration
Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1189, 1193 (2003).
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judicial sense is incompatible with the private nature of international
commercial arbitration. Whatever steps are being taken to achieve the
perception of fairness of arbitral process and awards in both the
arbitrating public and the legal and commercial community at large
could chip away at the privacy, flexibility, and appeal of commercial
arbitration. Striking a balance between the necessary private nature of
arbitration and the public nature of justice discussed and illustrated
above is a difficult undertaking. However, through education of the legal
community and the public at large about the specificities and benefits of
arbitration, as well as through the continued pursuit of the effective
safeguards already present in arbitration, such successful balance can
inevitably emerge. Most importantly, utmost care must be exercised in
advocating and implementing the potentially desirable changes to
arbitration in order to preserve arbitration and its benefits as a process
distinct from judicial dispute resolution and maintain its appeal to the
worldwide business community.
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